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THE CONSIDERATION OF RACE IN CHILD PLACEMENT:
DOES IT SERVE THE BEST INTERESTS OF BLACK AND
BIRACIAL CHILDREN?
DONNA B. MCELROY, ESQ.*
Every day, in every corner of America, we are
redrawing the color lines and redefining what race
really means. It's not just a matter of black and white
anymore, the nuances of brown and yellow and red
mean more - and less - than ever.l
I. INTRODUCTION
In a Newsweek special report,2 the editors explored an issue
they believe will shape the twenty-first century - a redefinition of
race.3 In so doing, Senior Editor Nancy Cooper noted that "[w]e're in
the middle of an incredibly significant ethnic and cultural shift.
'A
Where once there were three racial census categories, 5 today there are
thirty.6  "Black" and "White," 7 as well as other race and ethnic
distinctions, are still significant when it comes to the issues
* Staff Attorney, Maryland Office of the Attorney General; J.D. 2001, cum laude,
University of Baltimore School of Law.
1. Jon Meacham, The New Face of Race, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18, 2000, at 38.
2. Id.
3. Psychologists have begun to address this "changing face of America" and the special
needs of the racially and culturally integrated family. See Amanda L. Baden & Robbie J.
Steward, A Framework for Use with Racially and Culturally Integrated Families: The
Cultural-Racial Identity Model as Applied to Transracial Adoption, 9 J. Soc. DISTRESS & THE
HOMELESS, 309 (2000) (discussing the results of studies on transracial adoptions and providing
a theoretical model to be used with individuals raised in racially integrated families).
4. Meacham, supra note 1, at 4.
5. See id (noting that these categories were white, black and "quadroon"). See also
Julie C. Lythcott-Haims, Where Do Mixed Babies Belong: Racial Classification in America
and Its Implications for Transracial Adoption, 29 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REv. 531, 535 (1994)
(citing a representative race-defining statute indicating that a "quadroon" was an individual
whose fraction of black blood was 1/4).
6. Meacham, supra note 1, at 40.
7. This is not to suggest that other categories, such as ethnic background or religion,
are insignificant. I limit my discussion to "black" and "white" because it would be impossible
to address all of the issues unique to each of these different ethnic and racial groups. This
paper is limited to an examination of those issues involving the placement of black and
biracial children.
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surrounding child placements. 8 As childless couples race to adoption
agencies, they realize that race does matter. But here, it is the race of
the parents or prospective parents that matters more than the race of
the child.
The term transracial adoption means the "placing of a child
who is of one race or ethnic group with adoptive parents of another
race or ethnic group.' 9 Transracial adoptions reached their peak in the
1950's and 1960's. But in 1972, these adoptions slowed drastically
with the publication of a position paper by the National Association of
Black Social Workers" that criticized transracial adoptions. This
paper resulted in a move towards racial matching.12
Courts and child placement agencies use the "best interests"'1
3
test when placing black and biracial children with white families.
8. While this paper will limit the scope of its discussion to black and biracial children,
it should be noted that the analysis made here is equally applicable to children of other racial
and ethnic backgrounds.
9. Cynthia R. Mabry, "Love Alone is Not Enough!" In Transracial Adoptions. -
Scrutinizing Recent Statues, Agency Policies, and Prospective Adoptive Parents, 42 WAYNE L.
REV. 1347, 1350, n.9 (1996). The definition of transracial adoption generally refers to the
placement of black children with white families. The majority of transracially adopted
children are biracial or multiracial children with one white birth parent, who are adopted by
white parents or interracial parents. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong?
The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1175 (1991). One study
found only four white children placed with black parents. Id. at 1175, n.12 (citing DAWN DAY,
THE ADOPTION OF BLACK CHILDREN: COUNTERACTING INSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
(Lexington Books 1979)).
10. Following World War II, families in the United States adopted children from a
number of war-tom countries. The number of white children available for adoption decreased
in the 1950's and 1960's, while the number of available black children increased. Fewer black
families were available for the placement and adoption of this growing number of black
children, while qualified white families waited years to adopt a child. Black children became
the greatest available source for those who wished to adopt. To realistically deal with this
problem, agencies began placing black children with qualified white families. The 1960's saw
a push towards integration in schools, employment and adoption practices. See infra Part II.C
for a further discussion of factors that led to the growth of transracial placements.
11. The National Association of Black Social Workers was founded in 1968 by a group
of black social workers to address those social issues that concerned the black community.
NABSW Homepage, at http://www.nabsw.org/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2000).
12. Racial matching places a child with adoptive parents of the same race. See infra
Part lI.B.
13. While accepted as the proper test to decide child placement issues, no single
definition of the "best interest standard" exists. In fact, it is not even defined in Black's Law
Dictionary. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). The best interest standard requires that
the court consider and weigh all factors relating to the child's placement, and make a decision
in the child's best interest. See infra Part lII (providing a description of the Best Interest
Principle). See also Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interest
Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503 (1984) (indicating that child placement should further
the best interest of the child); Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests
232
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However, within this test there are the different and often competing
interests of the state, the child placement agency, the prospective
parents, and the child.
14
The issue of race affects child placement in custody
modification, 15 foster care,16 and adoption.17 In all instances, the "best
interest standard is used."' 18 Recently, the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 263319 held that when
applying the best interest principle, the race of an adoptive family is an
acceptable factor for courts to consider.
20
The consideration of race and race-based adoption policies
raises the issue of equal protection. The Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that the state may not abridge the
"equal protection of the laws." 21 Equal protection means that when
government action applies to members of a "suspect" class, the
government must show a compelling interest necessary to accomplish
Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 54 (1990/1991) (noting that "[t]he best
interest rule is widely accepted as the proper test to decide child placement issues").
14. See Howard, supra note 13, at 503 (noting that the use of the phrase "best interests"
tends to obscure the fact that there are different interests involved).
15. Custody of children is defined as "[t]he care, control and maintenance of a child
which may be awarded by a court to one of the parents as in a divorce or separation
proceeding." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 385. Custody modification refers
to changes in custody of children. See JOHN F. FADER, I1 & MARK E. SMITH, MARYLAND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASE FINDER, § 4.13 (1993) (discussing change in circumstances and
custody modifications).
16. Foster care refers to "continuous 24-hour care and supportive services provided for a
minor child placed by a child placement agency in an approved home." MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 5-501 (2002). Foster care is one type of "out-of-home placement." FAM. LAW § 5-501.
Courts may remove children may be removed from their natural parents after determining that
the child is delinquent or in need of supervision, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-
02 (2002), or in need of assistance, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-802 (2002).
Placement is temporary until circumstances have changed and the child can be moved back
into his home. FAM. LAW § 5-525 (2002). Foster care can also serve as temporary care until
the child is placed for adoption. FAM. LAW § 5-525.1 (2002).
17. Adoption refers to the legal process "in which a child's legal rights and duties
toward his natural parents are terminated and similar rights and duties toward his adoptive
parents are substituted." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 49. See also Melisa C.
George, Note, Tossed Salad: Diversity Considerations in Adoptions, 21 L. & PSYCHOL. REV.
197 (1997).
18. See infra Part I11.
19. 101 Md. App. 274, 646 A.2d 1036 (1994).
20. Id. See also infra Part IV.B.2 for a discussion of the court's reasoning in this
decision.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
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a legitimate purpose. Race is a suspect class.23  In Palmore v.
Sidoti,24 the Supreme Court found that when race is the sole
consideration for a court's decision in a custody modification, it
cannot survive strict scrutiny and thus violates the equal protection
clause.25
In Part II, this paper will discuss the history of transracial
adoptions in the United States, noting the importance of race
classification, the growth of transracial adoptions and the return to
26race-based placements. Part III will examine the Best Interest
Principle as the standard used in child placement, and will note that
there are four competing perspectives as to what is actually in the
child's "best interest. ' 2  Part IV will examine the Constitution,
statutes, and case law as they relate to the issues raised in the debate
over transracial adoptions. 28 Finally, Part V will provide an analysis
of the issue of transracial adoptions and will argue that transracial
adoptions are in the best interest of black and biracial children; that
transracial adoptions are not detrimental to the child's self-esteem and
self-assurance; and that race-based placement polices can destroy pre-
existing bonds in foster families and prevent black and biracial
children from ever being adopted.29
22. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 621 (1996) (indicating that a rational
relationship must be established between the legislation and its legitimate purpose).
23. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (considering the
historical purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and noting that race-based classifications
render statutes constitutionally suspect).
24. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
25. Id. See infra Part IV.B.3 for an explanation of equal protection case law and the
relevant standards of proof, including strict scrutiny.
26. See infra Part I1.
27. See infra Part Ill.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See infra Part V.
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II. THE HISTORY OF TRANSRACIAL ADOPTIONS
A. Race Classification
Virginia was one of the first colonies to legally define race and
attach legal and social significance to a person's classification.30 In
Virginia, there were only three racial classifications of legal
significance -- "white," "Indian," and "Negro and mulatto."'" In the
pre-Civil War period, both Negroes and mulattoes were identified as
"black., 32 The term "mulatto" referred to mixed-race individuals who
had a mixture of white and Native-American blood, or white and
Negro blood.33 More importantly, by the early twentieth century, the
definition of those classified as "white" narrowed to include only those
without any "trace whatsoever" of black blood.34 The drawing of legal
racial classifications made it possible for states to prohibit interracial
marriages and interracial sex. Enforced segregation in adult
relationships led to bans on transracial adoptions.
B. Early Development of Transracial Adoption
Transracial adoptions were prohibited by law in many states35
for a number of years. In fact, through the middle of the twentieth
century, "there were near-absolute barriers to transracial adoption
posed by adoption agency practice, by social attitudes, 36 and by the
30. See F. MICHAEL HIGGINBOTHAM, RACE LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND QUESTIONS
5 (Carolina Academic Press 2001).
31. Id. at 12.
32. Id. at 5, n.4.
33. See id. at 5, n.6 (discussing the legal definition of "mulatto" based on an individual's
percentage of non-white blood).
34. Id. at 17. In 1924, Virginia defined "white" as one "who has no trace whatsoever of
any blood other than Caucasian; but persons who have [only] one-sixteenth or less of the
blood of the American Indian ... shall be deemed to be white persons." Id. at n. 58. Further,
in 1930, Virginia defined colored as anyone "in whom there is ascertainable any Negro
blood." Id. See also Lythcott-Haims, supra note 5. Through the twentieth century, states
have enacted laws and courts have decided cases that have defined race. Id. An example of
such laws notes the following classifications based on the fraction of "Black Blood" to race: 0
= White; 1/8 = octoroon; 1/4 = quadroon; 1/2 = mulatto; 3/4 = griffe; 7/8 = sacatra; I = negro.
Id.
35. Mabry, supra note 9, at 1350.
36. Until the 1950's, segregation was legal. More importantly, it was socially acceptable
and even encouraged through the 1960's. Mixing races was the "ultimate symbol of outrage
and degradation" and a real threat to segregation. Id.
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law."37 Perhaps the law was merely reflective of a segregated society
that wished to maintain "racial separation in the context of the
family." 38  In a number of cases, courts determined that laws
prohibiting transracial adoptions were unconstitutional, causing state
legislatures to repeal them.
During this time, adoption agencies exhibited unlimited powers
over the adoption process. They adopted a powerful policy of
"matching., 40  Race was an important factor because it was believed
that racial matching maximized the child's chances of bonding and
forming a nurturing relationship with his or her new family.4 1 Until
the late 1940's, transracial adoptions were unheard of in this country.42
The earliest documented transracial adoption took place in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, in 1948.43
37. Id. Until 1954, segregation in public schools was legal. Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Additionally, until the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Loving v.
Virginia, restrictions on interracial marriages were legal. Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5
(1967). Into the 1960's, many states prohibited transracial adoptions altogether. See, e.g., LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.422 (West 1965); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a(8), 46b-1(4)
(Vernon 1959). In other states, statutes provided that an adoptive child could be returned if it
turned out that his race was different from that of the adoptive parents. See, e.g., Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 199.540 (1) (Michie 1982 & Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. §453.130 (Vernon
1952) (repealed 1952). Another statute provided that if the racial relationship of the parents to
the child was forbidden under the marriage laws, then the adoption was likewise forbidden.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2585 (Law. Co-op. 1962) (repealed 1964). At one time under
Virginia law, if a white woman bore a brown child, that child would immediately be taken
from the woman and placed in indenture. See Bartholet, supra note 9.
38. Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1176.
39. See Mabry, supra note 9, at 1350-51 (providing examples of case law invalidating
such statutes, and subsequent statutes repealing them).
40. Id. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, adoption agencies
followed the "matching" philosophy for child placement. Under this "matching" policy,
prospective parents and adoptive children were matched by physical characteristics, religion,
and intelligence. The goal of matching was to provide families with children who would be
most like their biological children. This, the agencies believed, maximized the chance that
bonding and nurturing would take place. In these early days, then, race was indeed an
acceptable feature to match. See Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1176.
41. See Mabry, supra note 9, at 1350-51.
42. Jehnna Irene Hanan, The Best Interest of the Child: Eliminating Discrimination in
the Screening ofAdoptive Parents, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 167, 176 (1997).
43. Mabry, supra note 9, at 1351 (noting that a white family adopted an African
American child).
236
2002] THE CONSIDERATION OF RACE IN CHILD PLACEMENT 237
C. Growth of Transracial Adoptions
Following World War 11, 44 the Korean War,45 and the Vietnam
War, there was an increase in the number of white families adopting
non-white children.47 The 1950's and 1960's also saw an increase in
the number of Latin American children adopted by white and mixed
race couples.48 With the social and legal changes of the 1960's came
an increased acceptance of transracial adoptions. 49  In fact, in the
1950's and 1960's, more than ten thousand children of non-white races
were adopted by white couples.5°
The significant increase in transracial adoptions is attributed to
a number of factors. 5' Adoption agencies saw this as a way to place
the large number of minority children who were awaiting adoption.52
Additionally, while more children were entering foster care, the
44. World War I1 ended in 1939, and while many European children survived, many of
their parents did not. Baden, supra note 3, at 310. International adoption became the remedy
to deal with the considerable number of abandoned and homeless children. Mary Ann
Candelario McMillan, International Adoption: A Step Towards a Uniform Process, 5 PACE
INTERN. L. REv. 137 (1993). This intercountry adoption of children from war-torn nations
continues to the present. Id.
45. During the Korean War, sexual relationships between U.S. servicemen and Asian
women became common and resulted in tens of thousands of births of Amerasian children in
Korea, as well as in Vietnam and the Phillippines. Robin S. Levi, Legacies of War: The
United States' Obligation Toward Amerasians, 29 STAN. J. INTERN. L. 459, 460 (1993). Faced
with tremendous discrimination in their own countries, these fatherless children became
available for adoption by U.S. citizens. Id. at 460.
46. Vietnamese Amerasian children conceived during the Vietnam War continue to
arrive in the United States as a result of the 1988 Homecoming Act, which recognizes the U.S.
government's obligation to care for Vietnamese Amerasians. Id.
47. Hanan, supra note 42, at 176.
48. Id. While Latin America has recently become a major supplier of children,
intercountry adoptions are a new phenomenon for these countries. McMillan, supra note 44,
at 139. Adoption of these children within their own countries has been hampered by cultural,
economic and religious conditions. Id.
49. The 1960's saw increased use of contraception, the legalization of abortion, and the
increased social acceptance of unwed mothers, greatly contributing to the decrease in available
white infants. Baden, supra note 3, at 311. See also Mabry, supra note 9, at 1351.
50. Id. See also Hanan, supra note 42, at 176.
5 1. See Howard, supra note 13, at 505-16. Howard identified seven factors contributing
to the rise in transracial adoptions: (1) identification of the battered child syndrome; (2)
deficiencies in the foster care system; (3) data identifying the effect of maternal and stable
family deprivation on institutionalized children; (4) a reduction in the number of white
children available; (5) reversal of agency policy to place the child with racially similar
families; (6) an insufficient number of minority homes available for minority children needing
placement; and (7) societal changes in attitudes towards racial integration, the adoption of
black children white families, and the willingness of social workers to make such placements.
Id.
52. Id.
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quality of the foster care system began to deteriorate. 53  More
significantly, there was a decline in the number of white children
available for adoption and a decline in the number of minority adults54
looking to adopt. Finally, the 1960's saw a new and growing interest
in harmony between the races.
In spite of this, by the early 1970's, the number of transracial
adoptions dropped significantly. 56  Suddenly, the policy of allowing
transracial adoptions was viewed by many professionals as less
desirable than inracial (same race) placement of black children.57 The
brief period of relative openness to transracial adoptions came to an
abrupt end as a result of the position taken by the National Association
of Black Social Workers in 1972.58 Thus began a period when
"transracial adoptions were drastically curtailed in favor of racial
matching."59
D. Shift to Race-Based Placement
In 1972, the National Association of Black Social Workers
(NABSW) issued a resolution that reflected its growing concern over
transracial adoption. The NABSW's condemnation of transracial
adoptions resulted in a thirty-nine percent decrease in the number of
53. Mabry, supra note 9, at 1351.
54. Id. See also Kim Forde-Mazrui, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best
Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REV. 925 (1994) (noting that "[m]any
factors converged to cause this increase"); Jacinda T. Townsend, Reclaiming Self-
Determination: A Call for Intraracial Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 173, 185-86
(1995) (discussing the obstacles that many black families face when attempting to adopt).
Fewer blacks are adopting because even when they choose to adopt, they find the process too
discouraging. Black families have found social workers to be biased and to discourage them
from adopting. Second, black families are made to feel inferior by social workers, who
critically examine their income, marital status, and the number of people in their families.
Third, black families find that the payment of fees for adopting a child remind them of the
buying and selling of black children into slavery. Id. A fourth, and very important economic
reason, is that black families are not provided with information on available subsidies that can
help to reduce the costs involved with adoption. Id. at 186. See also Howard, supra note 13,
at 513. Even more notable is the fact that there is no difference between black and white
adoption rates when the socioeconomic class is constant. Id. at 516.
55. Mabry, supra note 9, at 1351.
56. Douglas R. Esten, Transracial Adoption and the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994,
68 TEMP. L. REV. 1941 (1994).
57. Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1179.
58. Id. See also Howard, supra note 13, at 516-18 (discussing the condemnation of
transracial adoption by the NABSW in its 1972 position paper).
59. Mabry, supra note 9, at 1351.
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transracial adoptions in one year.60  In arguing that "same-race
placements were necessary for an African American child's well-
being, '61 the NABSW stated that:
Black children should be placed only with Black
families whether in foster care or for adoption. Black
children belong, physically, psychologically and
culturally in Black families in order that they receive
the total sense of themselves and develop a sound
projection of their future. Human beings are products
of their environment and develop their sense of values,
attitudes and self concept within their family structures.
Black children in white homes are cut off from the
healthy development of themselves as Black people.
62
The workshop participants further committed themselves to
"go back to [their] communities and work to end this particular form
of genocide."
63
The NABSW's position was soon adopted by public and
private adoption agencies alike. The paper's impact on transracial
adoptions was immediate and significant.64  The number of black
65
children adopted by white families in 1971 was 2,574. By 1972, this
figure dropped to 1,569, and in 1973 to 1,091.
66
While many state governments supported the NABSW's
argument, 67 Congress never passed legislation requiring race-based
preference.68 Rather, the adoption agencies began to play a major role
60. Howard, supra note 13, at 517 (citing Macaulay & Macaulay, Adoption for Black
Children: A Case Study of Expert Discretion, in 1 RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 265, 288
(R. Simon ed. 1978) (noting that there were 2,574 black-white adoptions in 1971, 1,569 in
1972, and 733 in 1974)).
61. Mabry, supra note 9, at 1352.
62. Id. The position of the NABSW was that: 1) blacks need to establish self-
determination, from birth to death; 2) black children have a need to identify with black people
in a black community, and that this need begins at birth; and 3) blacks need unity to build a
strong nation. Id. See also Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1180.
63. Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1180. See also Howard, supra note 13, at 518.
64. Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1180.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Mabry, supra note 9, at 1353.
68. Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1182.
239
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in the implementation of these policies.69  They used the NABSW's
position paper to justify the use of race-based policies.70
Following the enactment of race-based adoption statutes, courts
also began to factor in race when deciding adoption placement.
Unfortunately, the courts did not provide adequate guidelines when
racial considerations were balanced against other factors. 7 1 Thus, race
became a factor that was used at the court's discretion, resulting in
inconsistent decisions.
72
E. Renewed Interest in Transracial Adoptions
Recently there has been a renewed interest in transracial
adoptions. This trend may be related to the "disproportionately large
number of black children" waiting for permanent homes.73  The
number of black parents seeking to adopt continues to fall below the
number of black children entering the system.74 Even when they
desire to adopt, black families find that the process is discouraging,
social workers are biased and critical, and adoption fees are high in
comparison to .their incomes.75 While far too few black families are
69. Id.
70. See Davis v. Berks County Children & Youth Servs., 465 A.2d 614, 623 n.8 (Pa.
1983) (providing illustrations of the Child Welfare League of America's varying positions on
transracial adoptions since 1958); Perry, supra note 13, at 82-89 (propounding hypothetical
reasons why agencies deferred to the NABSW position).
71. Rebecca Varan, Desegregating the Adoptive Family: In Support of the Adoption
Antidiscrimination Act of 1995, 30 J. MAR. L. REV. 593, 597 (1997). See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 259.29 (West Supp. 1997), which in relevant part provided: "The authorized child-
placing agency shall give preference, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to placing
the child with (a) a relative... , (b) an important friend with whom the child has resided or
had significant contact ... , (c) a family with the same racial or ethnic heritage as the child, or
.. , (d) a family of different racial or ethnic heritage from the child which is knowledgeable
and appreciative of the child's racial or ethnic heritage . . . facilitate implementing the
preference." If the child's birth parent or parents explicitly request that placement in (a), (b) or
(c) not be followed, the authorized child-placing agency shall honor that request. ld.
72. Varan, supra note 71, at 597.
73. Esten, supra note 56.
74. Id.
75. See supra note 54 for a discussion of the four factors affecting the availability of
black adoptive parents. See also Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1196-97 (recognizing a limited
effort on the part of adoption workers to recruit black families); Howard, supra note 13, at
513-14 (criticizing adoption agencies for failure to inform the black community of the need for
adoptive families and failure to reduce the red tape and time involved in the process); Charlton
C. Copeland, Book Note, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 513 (2002) (reviewing DOROTHY
ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002) (discussing racial
disparity in the child welfare system and proposing the shift of control of this system to black
communities)).
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able to adopt, the opposite is true for white families. 76 Unfortunately,
recent race-based policies prevent white families from adopting
available black children.
77
In 1987, the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS)
estimated that eight percent of all adoptions were transracial.78 In
1990, twenty thousand children were awaiting placement, forty-three
percent of whom were black children.79 While approximately eighteen
thousand of those twenty thousand were placed, only twenty-nine
80percent of the available black children were placed that year. In
1996, over five hundred thousand children were in state foster care.
81
One-third of these children were African American. 82  Experts
expected only one-tenth of those children in foster care to be adopted
by the end of the year.83 An estimated fifteen percent of the thirty-six
thousand adoptions of foster children that took place in 1998 were
transracial or transcultural. 84 These statistics demonstrate that, unless
adoption agencies permit and encourage transracial adoptions, many
black and biracial children will not find permanent placements.
III. THE BEST INTEREST PRINCIPLE
The current legal approach to child placement focuses on
"what would most appropriately serve the welfare and best interests of
the child." 85 This unclear standard permits judges to rely on their own
personal judgments, morals and values, and other outside factors when
76. Esten, supra note 56, at 1942 (noting that there are many white families who are
willing to adopt black children).
77. See Bartholet, supra note 9. Bartholet sees current race matching polices as "a
coming together of powerful and related ideologies - old fashioned white racism, modem-day
black nationalism and what I will call 'biologism' - the idea that what is 'natural' in the
context of the biological family is what is normal and desirable in the context of adoption."
Id. at 1172.
78. NATIONAL ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, at http://www.calib.com/naic/pubs/
s trans.htm (last visited Sep. 20, 2000) (noting that one percent of white women adopt black
children, five percent of white women adopt children of other races, and two percent of
women of other races adopt white children. These estimates include foreign-born children).
79. NATIONAL ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, ADOPTION STATISTICS (July 1995).
80. Id. (noting that almost fifty-one percent of those adopted were white children).
81. 142 CONG. REc. H4433-03 (May 7, 1996) (testimony by Rep. Canady).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d 1036, 1043 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1994).
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making adoption decisions. 86 Despite the presence of a child "in need
of a loving, caring and supportive home," the final decision may not
prove to be in the child's "best interest."
88
A. Defining the "Best Interests" Standard
Whether the court is deciding foster placement, custody,
custody modification, or adoption, there is no simple answer when it
comes to child placement. No two cases are exactly alike and the
methods for determining a child's best interest are very time
consuming. s9 In each case, "[t]he fact finder is called upon to evaluate
the child's life chances in each of the homes competing for custody." 90
The fact finder must "predict with whom the child will be better off in
the future." 91 According to some theorists, what is in the child's best
interest "equals the fact finder's best guess."
92
B. Conflict of Interest and the Best Interest Standard
The best interest standard actually includes a number of
different and often competing interests. Those with differing
perspectives on what constitutes the "best interest of the child" include
the adoption agency, the child, the adopting parents and the black
community.
1. The Adoption Agency's Perspective
The interest of the adoption agency is simple: to find a
permanent home for the child.93 Yet, the agency too has an obligation
to place the child in a situation that will be in the child's best interest.
The agency wants to be certain that the family is stable, can provide
the child with necessities, will love this child as their own, and will not
86. See David P. Russman, Note, Alternative Families: In Whose Best Interests?, 27
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 31, 35 (1993).
87. George, supra note 17, at 197.
88. Id.
89. See Montgomery County v. Sanders, 381 A.2d 1154 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977)
(discussing the best interest standard as it is applied in Maryland in custody modification).
90. 1 JOHN F. FADER II, DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, at Children
*1 (1998).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Howard, supra note 13, at 528-30 (noting that adoption agencies are very powerful
in child placement matters and are allowed a great deal of discretion in these matters).
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neglect or abuse the child.94 In making an adoption determination, the
agency considers, among other factors, the family's finances, its home
environment, criminal records, and the existence of other foster or
adopted children in the family.95  From the adoption agency's
perspective, race is only one factor to consider.
2. The Child's Perspective
From the child's perspective, his or her best interest is served
by immediate and permanent placement with a family.96 In fact, early
permanent placement is a central factor in the healthy emotional
development of the adoptive child.97 A new placement may have an
adverse emotional effect on a child who has already spent a number of
years in a foster home placement. 98 It is very likely that he or she has
developed a sense of belonging to his or her foster family. Certainly, a
child who is loved and wanted will not want to be torn away from his
or her foster family to be placed in a new home. When agencies
continue to move children from one family to another, they are
disrupting their lives, their sense of stability and severing any family
bonds they may begin to develop.99 Yet, multiple moves are often
frequent for foster home children. One Missouri study noted that as
many as one-third of foster care children had lived in four or more
foster homes in less than five years. 100 In 1977, approximately sixty
percent of the children in foster care in New York had more than one
placement, and twenty-eight percent had been in three or more
94. See Hanan, supra note 42.
95. Id.
96. Howard notes that a black child awaiting adoption has two interests. The first is his
or her interest in a stable, loving family. The second is an interest in maintaining a cultural
identity. Howard observes that when same-race families are not available, these interests
"operate at cross-purposes and would lead to opposite results." This is because the interest in
a stable and permanent placement requires placement in any "suitable available family,
regardless of race," while the interest in cultural identity requires placement in a same-race
family, "even if the child has to wait." Howard, supra note 13, at 544-45.
97. Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1224 (citing W. FEIGELMAN AND A. SILVERMAN, CHOSEN
CHILDREN: NEW PATTERNS OF ADOPTIVE RELATIONSHIPS 93 (1983) (comparing the effects of
interracial adoptions with the effects of delaying placement and found the latter to be more
harmful)).
98. McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp 318, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1988) aff'd, 876 F.2d 308
(3d. Cir. 1989).
99. See Bryce J. Christensen, Two Cheers for Independent Adoption, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Dec. 3, 1987, n.107. See also In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297, 1305 (Cal. 1994)
(noting that children can develop psychological separation anxiety disorder when they are
faced with the prospect of separation from foster parents who have raised them since infancy);
McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp at 327 (noting that a child had become severely depressed as a result
of his separation from the family who had cared for him since he was an infant).
100. Christensen, supra note 99.
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placements.10' Thus, from the child's perspective, race is not a factor
to be considered.
3. The Adopting Parents' Perspective
While transracial adoptions refer to the adoption of a child of
one racial classification by parents of another racial classification, in
the United States transracial adoptions normally refer to the adoption
of a child of color by white parents. 102 In these cases, the family has
not only provided for the child's physical needs, but has already
bonded with their foster child. Since, from the perspective of both the
adoption agency and the child, an immediate and permanent placement
is the goal, the prospective adoptive parents see placement of the child
with them as the solution. From the adopting parents' perspective,
race is not a factor to consider.
4. The Black Community's Perspective
In 1972, the NABSW took the position that the adoption of
black children by white families is a type of genocide.' 0 3 From its
perspective, the best interest of the black child is met when he was
placed with a black family. Identifying unique needs of the black
child, the NABSW believes that black children need to establish a
sense of self, an identity that black children cannot receive from white
parents. 10 4 The NABSW notes that black children need to establish
self-determination, and that this is something that only a black family
can teach a black child.'0 5 In addition, the NABSW points out that
black children have a need to identify with black people in a black
community, and growing up in a white home, in an all-white or
predominantly white community, will impede the black child from
developing this identity.10 6
Today the NABSW has made the preservation of black
families its focus. 1° 7 In 1994, the organization published its current
101. Smith v. Org. of Foster Fams. for Equity and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 837 (1977).
102. Kristie Ann Rooney, Racial Matching vs. Transracial Adoption: An Overview of the
Transracial Adoption Debate, 53 J. Mo. BAR 32 (1997).
103. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. See also Bartholet, supra note 25, at
1180.
104. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. See also Howard, supra note 13, at 530-
33 (discussing the interest of minority groups in deciding whether non-whites can adopt
minority children and in maintaining their cultural and racial identity).
107. Margaret F. Brinig, Moving Toward a First-Best World. Minnesota's Position on
Multiethnic Adoptions, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 553, n.22 (2002).
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policy position regarding transracial adoptions. 10 8 While reaffirming
its stand that "African American children should not be placed with
white parents under any circumstances," it has taken the position that
black families "are disproportionately affected by the child welfare
system."' 10 9 The NABSW recommends that an attempt first be made to
place the black child within his extended family." 0 When this is not
possible, placement should be made within the child's own
community."' Further, when considering a transracial adoption, the
NABSW encourages social workers and agencies to place black and
biracial children with families who understand the reality of race in
our country today, the dangers of isolating the a child from members
of his or her race, and the need to teach and experience cultural
diversity. 112
While an immediate and permanent placement for the black
child is desirable, the NABSW would prefer that agencies delay
placement until a more acceptable placement can be made within the
black community. From the black community's perspective, race is
the most important factor to be considered." 3
IV. THE LAW
Congress and the courts have attempted to improve the state of
foster care and to initiate improvements in adoption placements
through legislation and judicial decisions.
108. MICHELLE M. HUGHES, ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. HANDBOOK, § 8.15
(2002).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. While most of the criticism aimed at transracial adoptions has come from the
NABSW, there are a number of other outspoken opponents. Rooney, supra note 102, at 32.
Opponents suggest that the needs of the black culture and its survival must be considered and
that the special needs of a child of color cannot be met in a transracial placement. Brinig,
supra note 107, at 553-54. As an alternative, one group has proposed kinship foster care or
the permanent placement of the child with members of his extended family. Id. at 577-84.
Professor Dorothy Roberts has criticized the Child Welfare System and accused the
government of the destruction of the black family by "reinforcing disparaging stereotypes
about black family unfitness." Copeland, supra note 75, at 514. See also Susan L. Brooks,
The Case for Adoption Alternatives, 39 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 43 (2001)
(examining alternatives to the traditional adoption that foster relationships with biological and
extended families).
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A. Federal Law
The debate over whether white families should be permitted to
adopt black children continued for over twenty years. 114 Then in 1994,
Congressional research revealed that of the nearly 500,000 children in
foster care, tens of thousands were waiting for adoption." 5  The
median length of time that children waited to be adopted was two
years and eight months." 6 Congress was specifically disturbed about
the large number of minority children who remained in foster care
waiting adoption.' 1 7 In addition, it was disturbed by the continued use
of race-matching policies by adoption agencies.' 18 Finally, Congress
recognized that there was an urgent need to locate and recruit available
and qualified black families to adopt.' '9
Alarmed over the large number of children in institutions and
foster care, Congress passed the Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA)
in October of 1994,12 and the Small Business Job Protection Act of
1996 (SBJPA). 12' Both acts prohibited the improper use of race, color
or national origin in custody placement proceedings, by governments
or entities that received federal funds. 22 Thus, the law affected all
fifty states and an unknown number of agencies. 123  However, the
MEPA did permit states and agencies to take into consideration the
culture, ethnic, or racial background of the child, as well as the ability
of the potential family to meet the needs of the child. 124 Because of
114. Mabry, supra note 9, at 1349.
115. Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-382,
§552, 108 Stat. 4056 (1994). Mabry, supra note 9, at 1354.
116. Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 382.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (West 1994), repealed by Small Business Job Protection Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996).
121. Pub. L. No. 104-188, 100 Stat. 1755; HR 3448, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20,
1996).
122. Mabry, supra note 9, at 1359.
123. Id.
124. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5115(a)(2) (West 1994) (repealed 1996). The statute provides in
relevant part: (1) An agency, or entity, that receives Federal assistance and is involved in
adoption or foster care placements may nQt (A) categorically deny to any person the
opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent, solely on the basis of the race, color, or
national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved; or (B) delay or deny the
placement of a child for adoption or into foster care, or otherwise discriminate in making a
placement decision, solely on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or
foster parent, or the child, involved. (2) Permissible consideration: An agency or entity to
which paragraph (1) applies may consider the cultural, ethnic, or racial background of the
child and the capacity of the prospective foster or adoptive parents to meet the needs of a child
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this last provision in the MEPA and the possible equal protection
implications, the provision was deleted and repealed by the SBJPA.121
Congress designed the MEPA to end race-based decisions in
adoption placement. 126  The purpose of the law was to promote the
best interest of the children by decreasing the wait time for children
prior to adoption, preventing discrimination in the placement of
children, and assisting in the identification and recruitment of foster
and adoptive families that can meet children's needs.' 27 To comply
with the MEPA goal of recruiting qualified black families for
placement, agencies are required to locate families who "reflect the
ethnic and racial diversity of [adoptable] children in the State [where]
adoptive homes are needed.'
' 28
B. Maryland Law
1. Statutory Law
Maryland law encourages transracial adoptions by preventing
the use of race as the determinative factor in adoptions. Under
Maryland law, once the court has terminated the natural parents'
rights, a child may be adopted with the consent of the child placement
agency.'29  The placement of the child cannot be withheld by the
executive head of the agency, based solely on the race or religion of
the potential adoptive parents, unless it would be in the best interest of
the child. 3 ° Further, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that
of this background as one of a number of factors used to determine the best interests of a child.
Id.
125. Publ. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (Aug. 20, 1996). See Mabry, supra note 9
(discussing whether the MEPA would have survived a strict scrutiny analysis). In Palmore v.
Sidoti, the Supreme Court noted that "[c]lassifying persons according to their race is more
likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concern. Such classifications are
subject to the most exacting scrutiny." 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984). Racial and ethnical
distinctions must be strictly scrutinized by the courts, and "such classifications are
constitutional only if they embody narrowly-tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests." Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1998).
126. George, supra note 17, at 206.
127. Mabry, supra note 9, at 1358.
128. Id. at 1360 (citing the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 622(b)(9) (West 1995)).
129. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-311(b) (2000). If the individual is at least 10 years
of age, he or she must also give consent to the adoption. § 5-311 (b)(2).
130. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-311(b)(2) (2000). This statute provides in relevant
part that the executive head of the child placement agency may not withhold consent for the
sole reason that the race or religion of the prospective adoptive parents is different from that of
the individual to be adopted or of the birth parents, where to do so would be contrary to the
best interests of the child. § 5-31 l(b)(2).
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statutes such as MEPA were enacted to resolve exactly those situations
in which potential adoptive parents are denied the right to adopt based
solely on either religion or their race.' 3
1
2. Case Law
The case of In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633132 reflects
the law in Maryland and raises the typical arguments regarding issues
of transracial adoption, including application of the best interest
standard, immediate and permanent placement, maintaining strong
emotional bonds between foster parents and foster children, providing
the black child with self-awareness and a sense of belonging, and
possible Fourteenth Amendment violations. In this case, the white
foster parents of a black child, Tiffany, were denied the right to adopt
the child.'33 Tiffany and her two older brothers were removed from
the custody of their mother in July 1990.134 At the time of her
removal, Tiffany was six months old. She was addicted to crack from
birth. 135  The social service agency placed the children in separate
foster homes. Tiffany went to the home of a white family, the Mauks,
known for their work with drug-addicted infants, while her brothers
were placed with a black family, Mr. and Mrs. S. 136
Within a year, Tiffany showed significant developmental
improvement and had developed a strong relationship with the two
adopted children of the Mauks.137 Within the first two weeks of their
custody of Tiffany, the Mauks began to inquire about the possibility of
adopting her. 138  But in November 1991, Washington County
Department of Social Services (WCDSS) decided to place Tiffany
with the S. family, which had care of her two brothers. 139
131. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d 1036 (1994), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 809 (1995).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1039.
135. Id. It was later learned that Tiffany had been a victim of sexual abuse as well. Id.
136. Id. The Mauks had already adopted two children Janae, a four-year-old black child,
and Dustin a four year old biracial child. Both of these children had formerly been in the
Mauk's care as foster children. Id.
137. Id. When Tiffany had first entered the Mauk's home, her development was below
her chronological age. Within a year she had reached normal development and her
pediatrician attributed this to the care received from the Mauks. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. Up to this point, there had been no attempt on the part of either the WCDSS or
the S. family to maintain any contact between Tiffany and her brothers, Justin and Rodney. In
fact, Mr. and Mrs. S. admitted that they had given no thought prior to this placement or the
idea of adopting Tiffany. Id.
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WCDSS decided that the Mauks were unsuitable and pursued
an adoption for Tiffany with Mr. and Mrs. S.14' The WCDSS initially
wanted to reunite Tiffany with her brothers.' 41 While the WCDSS
considered the race of the potential adoptive parents, it could not
quantify the weight that was placed on that factor. 142 The WCDSS did
note that the Mauks lived in a predominantly white neighborhood and
that they were concerned about the possibility that Tiffany would not
be integrated into a black community.'
43
On March 29, 1992, Tiffany fell into a swimming pool and was
taken to the hospital. 144  The hospital advised that it would be in
Tiffany's best interest to remain in the Mauk home. 145 Despite this
advice, the WCDSS removed her on April 1, 1992 and placed her with
the S. family. 146 After two and a half weeks, the Mauks were granted
visitation. In May 1992, however, the visitations were abruptly
terminated without any explanation from the WCDSS. 14 7 Eventually
the Mauks filed a cross-petition for adoption.1
48
At the circuit court hearing, both parties presented expert
testimony on the effect of race in determining Tiffany's placement.
149
On January 6, 1993, the circuit court ordered that the parties be
evaluated by a neutral party.150 Finally, on May 6, 1993, more than a
year after Tiffany had been removed from the Mauk's home, the court-
appointed expert recommended that Tiffany be permanently placed
with the S. family.' 51 While the expert recognized that the Mauks
were equally suitable as adoptive parents for Tiffany, she felt that
"Tiffany [would] suffer loss again if she [was] sent back to the Mauks.
This [would] be debilitating to her development and well-being."
152
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1040.
143. Id. This was also a concern voiced by the NABSW in the adoption of their position
paper. See supra Part II.D.
144. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d at 1040.
145. Id. This advice was based on the observations of the treating physicians who noted
that Tffany had suffered a trauma. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1041. The court appointed Barbara DiCocco, a licensed social worker. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. Ms. DiCocco's opinion was based on her belief that there was "the potential for
further harm to the child if she was removed yet again from an environment that the evidence
suggests she considered to be her home." Id.
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The Mauks appealed the circuit court's decision and argued
that the WCDSS violated Maryland law by placing Tiffany with the S.
family. 5 3  The Mauks also argued that the trial court erred in
dismissing their complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.154 The Maryland
Court of Special Appeals, while recognizing that the actions of the
WCDSS were "reprehensible," held that Tiffany should remain with
the S. family.' 55
The Mauks asserted that the WCDSS denied their adoption
solely because of racial factors.156 Additionally, the WCDSS failed to
grant "preference for adoption based on their status as long-term foster
parents."' 57  The court explained that Maryland law does not give
foster parents the right of first refusal. 158 Rather, the court stated, "the
relevant provision clearly states that the agency must "consider"
placement with a current long-term foster parent.'
The court noted that the Mauks had not requested consideration
by the agency for the adoption of Tiffany until after the agency
determined the S. family was suitable.' 60 There was no rejection based
on race. The court then stated that the trial court was required to use
the "best interest" standard and in so doing "[t]he trial court may
evaluate any number of factors when making a decision in an adoption
proceedings."' 61 The trial court considered all issues raised by the
parties, and while race played a role in its decision, it was not the
overriding factor. 162  Additionally, the court emphasized that the
"proper focus of the trial court's inquiry" is Tiffany's best interest, and
not the Mauks'. 163 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that
the trial court had "made a well-informed and rational decision when it
153. Id. The Mauks also argued that the trial court had abused its discretion by granting
the S. family's Petition for Adoption and by finding that it was in Tiffany's best interest. Id.
154. Id. The Mauks argued that they had standing to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and that they were denied equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1042-43.
158. Id. Rights of first refusal are sometimes described as preemptive rights or rights of
preemption. A right of first refusal "has been described as closely related in purpose to an
option." Ollie v. Rainbolt, 669 P.2d 275 (Okla. 1983). Such rights give to the holder a
preferential treatment. The Mauks claimed that they had the right to refuse to adopt Tiffany
before WCDSS made her available for permanent adoptions.
159. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d at 1042-43.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1044.
163. Id.
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concluded that Tiffany's interests would best be served by adoptive
placement with the S. family."
' 164
The court held that to sustain a claim that they were denied due
process, the Mauks must "show that they were deprived of a federally
secured right by persons acting under color of state law."' 165 Noting
that "the foster parent relationship is a creature of statute"' 66 and is not
legally equivalent to either adoptive or biological families, the court
concluded that "the preservation of the foster care family unit for
adoptive purposes is not a liberty interest protected by the
Constitution.' '9 67  Therefore, the Mauks couldn't sustain their due
process claim.
The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Mauks'
argument that they had been denied equal protection.'68 The court
noted the trial court finding that the WCDSS used race as the sole
factor in determining Tiffany's placement.' 69 After considering the
facts in the light most favorable to the Mauks, the trial court concluded
that the WCDSS had not violated the Mauk's equal protection rights.
Although the Court of Special Appeals agreed that the trial court erred
in its findings, it held that the error was harmless because, at the time
of the motion, the Mauks were without any remedy. 70  The relief
initially sought by the plaintiffs had become moot by the trial court's
independent ruling in the adoption proceedings.'
71
3. Equal Protection Issues
White foster parents alleging that the agency's denial of their
request to adopt their black foster child was a violation of their rights
have historically brought most adoption-related equal protection
claims. 172 Because the United States Supreme Court held that while
the rearing of a child is a fundamental right, 173 the adoption of a child
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1045.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1045-46.
168. Id. at 1048.
169. Id
170. Id. at 1048-49.
171. Id. at 1049.
172. See J.H.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072
(1990); Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th
Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Tallman v. Tabor, 859 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Mich. 1994); DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F Supp. 25 (E.D. Pa. 1991); McLaughlin v.
Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff d, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989).
173. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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is not, 174 equal protection claims brought at the state level have been
more popular. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides constitutional protection for family relations. 75 When state
agencies and courts use race to determine child placement, legitimate
concerns arise over possible Equal Protection violations. 1
76
In Palmore v. Sidoti,177 the Supreme Court held that race can
not be used to determine an adult's ability to care for and raise a
child. 178 In Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 179 the Court held in that all
government action subjecting a person to unequal treatment must
justify use of such classifications. 18  The Court stated that "all racial
classification, imposed by a federal, state, or local government actor,
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." 181 The
strict scrutiny standard dictates that the use of racial classifications to
determine adoptive placement "[is] constitutional only if they embody
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests."' 82 The Adarand decision will have a significant impact on
government adoption agencies that show preference toward one race
over another. 183 In fact, it is likely that those who oppose interracial
adoptions will be unable to meet the high standard of strict scrutiny.1
84
4. Case Law From Other Jurisdictions
Most courts have permitted a child's race to influence his or
her placement. 185  Because so many difficulties can arise with
174. In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H.1987) (noting that there is "no
such right to adopt, to be a foster parent, or to be a child care agency operator, as these
relationships are legal creations governed by statute").
175. These protections come from the Court's decision that family relationships are
"within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees."
Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
176. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. See also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 54 (discussing
case law and implications of Equal Protection violations).
177. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
178. Id.
179. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 227. This case, while dealing with anti-discrimination clauses in government
contracts, is relevant to transracial adoption statutes because it held that all government actors
are required to justify racial classifications that subject any person to unequal treatment. Id.
182. Id.
183. George, supra note 17, at 206 (discussing the application of strict scrutiny to any use
of racial criteria).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 205. See also Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972)
(discussing the allowance of race as a factor in deciding adoption of a black child by a black
husband and white wife); In re Gomez, 424 S.W. 2d 656 (Tex. App. 1967) (permitting race to
be one of the factors considered in a black man's adoption of his white wife's two daughter).
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interracial adoptions, race may be considered as one of the factors in
making a placement decision.' 86 Courts recognize that "it is a natural
thing for children to be raised by parents of their same ethnic
background,"' 87 and thus, considering race in child placement does not
constitute an equal protection violation.188 Despite disagreements
about the extent to which race may be used, all courts agree that race
may not be used automatically to prescribe the appropriate adoptive
placement of a child. 189  When a white couple was prevented from
adopting a black child, the Ohio Court of Appeals noted that while
cultural heritage is a factor to be considered, it could not be the
"determinative factor."'
190
186. J.H.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 244 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that "race may be
considered as a relevant factor in determining the best interest of the child").
187. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Child Servs, 563 F.2d 1200, 1205
(5th Cir. 1977) (holding that "consideration of race in the child placement process suggests no
racial slur or stigma in connection with any race"). See also Re Petition of D.I.S., 494 A.2d
1316 (App. D.C. 1985); Re Petition of R.M.G., 454 A.2d. 776 (App D.C. 1982) (upholding the
statutory requirement that race be a relevant consideration in determining whether an adoption
should be approved despite a contention that it violated the equal protection doctrine); Re
Adoption of A Minor, 228 F.2d 446 (App. D.C. 1973) (approving an interracial adoption as
serving the best interest of the child); Compos, 341 F. Supp. at 264 (ruling that a Louisiana
statute providing that a "single person over the age of twenty-one years, or a married couple
jointly, may petition to adopt any child of his or their race" was unconstitutional because it
violated the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment when it limited
interracial adoptions); Krakow v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 92 N.E.2d 184 (Mass. 1950)
(pointing out that due regard should be given to race and religion); Spath v. Willis, 423
N.Y.S.2d 551 (3d Dept. 1980); In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio 1991); State ex rel.
Portage County Welfare Dep't v. Summers, 311 N.E.2d 6 (Ohio 1974); Re Adoption of Baker,
185 N.E.2d 51 (Oh. 1962) (noting that the statute provided specific guidance by requiring
investigation into the parties' respective racial, religious, and cultural backgrounds); In re
Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (holding that a statute providing that no white
child could be adopted by a black, nor could a black child be adopted by a white, was
unconstitutional as violating the equal protection clause).
188. Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1205. See also Rooney, supra note 102, at 33 (noting that
"Drummond established the principle that adoption decisions lacking invidious intent do not
offend the Equal Protection Clause."). In Drummond the adoption agency had considered race
only to promote the child's welfare. Rooney, supra note 102, at 33.
189. See e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984) (noting that "[t]he effects of
racial prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child
from the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate person to have such
custody").
190. In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). The court noted that
factors such as the ability of the prospective adoptive parent to care for the child, to provide a
safe and stable home, and to provide for the child's racial and cultural needs, should be
considered. Id.
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C. Race as a Factor in Custody Cases
The courts are split on the issue of whether courts can use race
as a factor in custody disputes. Some courts have held that racial
characteristics cannot determine whether a black father or white
mother should be awarded custody of their biracial children.' 9' These
courts maintain that it is improper to modify the custody of a child
from the natural mother, based solely on the mother's remarriage to a
person of a different race.' 92 The court in Holt v. Chenault9 3 held that
the impact of the custodial mother's subsequent biracial marriage is an
inappropriate basis for the modification of custody. 194 However, in
Raysor v. Gabbey, the court held that race is a relevant factor in the
placement of a biracial child when the natural father is black and the
grandparents are white.' 95  The court process used to determine
custody of a child when race is a factor is applicable to transracial
adoption placement.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Transracial Adoptions are in the Best Interest of the Black Child
The child is ultimately affected by the agency's decision to
either approve a transracial placement or leave the child in a temporary
home while searching for a same-race family.' 96 Transracial adoptions
encourage the immediate and permanent placement of a child and can
prevent the emotional problems that arise when a child is taken from a
loving family with which he has already developed a positive
relationship. 97 On the other hand, the NABSW argues that only same
race adoptions can guarantee the development of a black child's
cultural identity and develop positive self-esteem.' 98
191. Fountaine v. Fountaine, 133 N.E.2d 532 (1956).
192. Langin v. Langin, 276 N.E.2d 822 (1971).
193. 722 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1987).
194. Id.
195. 395 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1977) (stating that there are many factors to be considered in
determining the child's best interests, including the fact that a biracial child must face unique
problems).
196. Howard, supra note 13, at 533 (discussing the interests of the individual child).
197. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
198. See supra Part II.D.
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B. Race Should Not Be A Factor
Some have argued that race should, in fact, be a factor in child
placement because such a consideration is in the black child's best
interest. The NABSW is against all transracial adoptions for a number
of reasons. Specifically, the NABSW recommends that black children
be placed in black families "where they belong physically,
psychologically and culturally in order that they receive the total sense
of themselves and develop a sound projection of their future."' 199 The
NABSW argues that if black children are placed in white homes they
are "cut off from the healthy development of themselves as black
people .... 200 The nurturing of one's self identity is a primary
function of a family, and the NABSW argues that a white family
cannot provide a positive self identity for a black child.2 1' Further,
they believe that only a black family can provide a black child with the
coping mechanisms necessary to survive in today's society.
202
Those who support same-race placement note that a
transracially adopted child may face other unique problems. For
example, the child may be the only black child in an otherwise white
neighborhood, attend an all-white school or church, and be placed in a
position where he will face possible rejection by his peers. Further,
a black child will stand out in his family based on physical factors
alone.204  Supporters of same-race placements argue that the
importance of identifying with ones own family is significant, and
would never be achieved by a black child in a white family.20 5
Evidence exists to support the NABSW's claim "that minority
children in general experience problems with self-esteem and
emotional adjustment due to the effects of prejudice and racism. 20 6
Many critics of transracial adoption agree that a white family cannot
199. Rooney, supra note 102, at 32. See also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 54, at 926.
200. Rooney, supra note 102, at 32.
201. Id.
202. For the small number of transracially adopted children who have developed identity
problems, failure of the adoptive parents to acknowledge the child's racial background was a
factor in causing confusion. A.R. Silverman, Outcomes of Transracial Adoption, 3 THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: ADOPTION 104, 108. See also Hanan, supra note 42, at 198 (noting that
regardless of a parent's skin color, a parent's attitude towards the child's racial heritage and
identity has a strong impact on how the child views himself).
203. Howard, supra note 13, at 534.
204. Rooney, supra note 102, at 32.
205. See Anne Adams Lang, When Parents Adopt a Child and a Whole Other Culture,
N.Y. TIMEs, March 8, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/specials/030800gen-
adoption.html; Howard, supra note 13, at 538.
206. Howard, supra note 13, at 537.
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provide the type of environment that will help a black child retain and
develop his cultural identity.20
7
In direct contradiction to the NABSW position, one study
showed that transracially adopted children developed healthy, positive
attitudes about racial identity and self-esteem. 20 8 Studies indicate that
transracially adopted children "are as well adjusted as their inracially
placed counterparts. '' z°9  Several studies indicate that transracial
adoptive parents foster "a healthy sense of racial identity and pride in
their children. 210 One might "seriously call into question the wisdom
of resisting transracial placement" when looking at the success
revealed by studies on transracial adoptions. 21 1  While some studies
have reported difficulties with transracial adoptions, they are
inconclusive.
212
Black adoptees raised in white families tend to develop
different attitudes about race and race relations than do black adoptees
raised in black families.213 Some evidence indicates "that transracial
adoption may even have a positive impact in terms of black children's
sense of comfort with their racial identity." 214  Additionally,
researchers note that "transracial adoptees appear more positive than
blacks raised inracially about relationships with whites, more
comfortable in those relationships, and more interested in a racially
integrated lifestyle.,
215
Other studies disagreed with the NABSW position and its
arguments. 2 16  A comprehensive twelve-year, longitudinal study of
207. ld. at 538.
208. Rita J. Simon, From Data to Public Policy: Affirmative Action, Sexual Harrassment,
Domestic Violence, and Social Welfare, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 343, 345 (1997) (book review).
209. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 54, at 944.
210. Id. at n.122.
211. Id. at 944.
212. Id. at n.125. See also Howard, supra note 13, at 534, n.155. Rita Simon and Howard
Altstein conducted a longitudinal study of transracial adoptees, publishing their results in
1977, 1981, and 1987. Bartholet, supra note 9, n. 11. Since this study, many other similar
studies have been conducted, comparing transracially adopted children to children raised by
foster families, families with single mothers, and unrelated black families. See Brinig, supra
note 107, at 586-87 and accompanying footnotes; Rooney, supra note 102 at 34 (examining
results of empirical studies). Generally, these studies have shown that transracially adopted
children exhibit comparable coping skills, educational success, family relationships, and self-
esteem as other groups of children. Id.
213. Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1216-17.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1218 (indicating that some transracial adoptees describe themselves as biracial
or American or "human" rather than black).
216. See Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1211-16; Howard, supra note 13, at 534-45; Rooney,
supra note 102, at 34.
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adopted children, found that transracially adopted children were
comparable to other adoptees in terms of self-esteem, coping abilities,
family relationships, and educational achievement. 21 7 Contrary to the
NABSW's predictions, "transracially placed children have a sense of
racial identity and pride comparable with inracially placed black
children.,
218
To subscribe to the idea that only a black family can provide a
black child with a sense of self and identification with the black
community assumes that all black families place an equal emphasis on
the development of these characteristics. However, "not all black
families identify with black culture," foster a sense of ethnic pride and
"provide a positive cultural setting for their children. 21 9
Growing up in a transracial family provides the child with
unique advantages. For example, the child develops a sense of
belonging to more than one culture, 22 of being more tolerant of the
differences of others,221 and experiences the richness of celebrating
more than one culture.222 In addition, opponents of transracial
adoptions overlook the impact of the family and the basic
characteristics of the parents, both of which are independent of race.
223
They similarly ignore the importance of environmental attitudes,
parenting attitudes and skills, and the effect these factors will have on
the child's adjustment.224 The transracially adopted child will identify
with some culture or race based on his knowledge, awareness,
competence, and comfort with that cultural or racial group.225 This
identification may be with the child's own race, with the race of his
adoptive parents, or with a multi-race group.
226
In its analysis of what might happen when a black child is
placed in a white family, the NABSW overlooks that love, self-esteem
and survival skills do not come in colors. Most white families desiring
to adopt a black child are already aware of the problems that they and
217. Rooney, supra note 102, at 34. Rita Simon and Howard Altstein conducted this
study. Id.
218. Id.
219. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 54, at 948.
220. See Baden, supra note 3; Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1218.
221. See Baden, supra note 3; Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1218.
222. See Baden, supra note 3; Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1218.
223. Baden, supra note 3, at 312.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Baden, supra note 3. The author identifies a theoretical model that separates
racial identifications and cultural identifications. Id. The author identifies four types of
culture identifications: 1) Bicultural Identification; 2) Pro-Self Cultural Identification; 3) Pro-
Parent Cultural Identification; and 4) Culturally Undifferentiated Identification. Id.
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the child will face. They are aware of the need to foster the child's
cultural and racial identity. The placement of a black child in a white
family is not a less desirable option to a delay in placement, perhaps
even a permanent delay, until an available black adoptive family is
located. The immediate and permanent placement of a waiting child is
more important than maintenance of ethnic heritage and cultural
identity because the longer the placement is delayed the less likely that
child will ever be placed with an adoptive family.
Evidence shows that a delay in placement, even when it is to
accommodate inrace placement, is costly to children awaiting
227adoption. Professionals agree that "children need continuity in the
context of a permanent home in order to flourish., 22 8 Experts in child
development note that "continuity and stability in a child's
environment is essential," and the "absence of a stable and enduring
parental relationship" is "devastating and traumatic to a child's
development., 229  Evidence also shows that children do better in
adoption than in foster care.230 More importantly, the child's age at
placement is "a central factor in determining just how well adoptees
will do in terms of various measures of adjustment., 231
A study by Feigelman and Silverman, concluded that
"deleterious consequences of delayed placement are far more serious
than those of transracial adoption." 232 Further, their findings implied
that "when a choice must be made between transracial placement and
continued foster or institutional care, transracial placement is clearly
the option more conducive to the welfare of the child., 233  Black
children who cannot be placed with black families, because policy
makers or social workers choose not to place them in transracial
adoptions, will face "significant and lasting psychological harm." 234
Thus, the key issue is the expeditious placement of the black
child in a qualified family, regardless of the family's race. The "best
interest" of the child dictates that he or she be placed as quickly as
possible in a qualified family setting.
227. See supra Part II.E.
228. Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1223 (citing a study by W. Feigelman and A. Silverman
that compared the significance of race matching to the significance of delay in placement).
229. Id. at n.162.
230. Id. at 1224.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1224-25.
234. Id. at 1225.
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C. Race-Based Placement Can Destroy Pre-existing Family Bonds
Courts have consistently held that agencies may consider race
as a relevant factor, but not as the sole, determinative factor in child
235placement. Such decisions often discount emotional bonds
developed between a child and his foster family and can lead to heart-
breaking results.236 When agencies continue to move foster care
children from one family to another, the agencies disrupt the childrens'
lives, upset their sense of stability, and sever developing family
bonds. Bonding is crucial to adoption and an important part of a
child's emotional development. 238 Children who are separated from
their foster family suffer emotionally. 239 The prospect of separation
can cause these children to develop a psychological separation anxiety
disorder or severe depression.
240
D. Race-based Placement Prevents Adoptable Children From Being
Adopted
One-half of all children waiting to be adopted are black.241
Forty-three percent wait up to four years to be adopted. 242 In New
Orleans, it is so difficult to place black boys that they are labeled as
"special needs," the same title as children who suffer from emotional
problems and physical handicaps. 243 In Pennsylvania, two-thirds of
the hard to place children are black, and that only one-third of
potential adoptive families are black.244 Based on these figures, it is
evident that many black children may never be placed.
Statistically, it is in the black child's best interest to be adopted
immediately. Black foster care children presently wait for adoption
thirty-three percent longer than the national median.2 45  In fact, a
healthy black infant will wait approximately five times longer than a
235. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
236. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the results of severed family bonds).
237. See supra Part III.B.2.
238. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
241. George, supra note 17, at 198 (citing Desda Moss, Adoption Plan Only a First Step,
Advocates Say, USA TODAY, May 7, 1996, at 3A).
242. Id.
243. Id. (citing Edward Pratt, Debating Interracial Adoptions, SAT. STATE
TIMES/MORNING ADVOCATE, May 18, 1996, at 7B).
244. Id. See also Texas Seeks Colorblind Adoption, NAT'L L. J., April 24, 1995, at A10.
245. Rooney, supra note 102, at 32 (citing Davidson M. Pattiz, Racial Preference in
Adoption: An Equal Protection Challenge, 82 GEO. L.J. 2571,2572 (1994)).
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healthy white infant to be placed. The longer a child stays in foster
care, the less likely he will be adopted. The alternative to transracial
placement is not always same-race placement. The child can be placed
in foster care, institutional care, temporary care or not placed at all. 246
Therefore, if the foster care system relies solely on black couples to
adopt black and biracial children, many of these children will remain
unplaced.
E. Transracial Adoptions Are Not Detrimental to Black Child's Self-
Esteem or Self-Awareness
Transracially adopted children develop very positive attitudes
about their racial identity and their self-esteem.247  Evidence
demonstrates that transracially adopted children develop a strong sense
of black identity.248 Consistently, studies have indicated that as many
as seventy-five percent of transracially adopted preadolescent and
younger children have adjusted well in their adoptive homes. 249 A
recent study, it was found that transracial adoption was not
"detrimental for the adoptee in terms of adjustment, self-esteem,
academic achievement, peer relationships, parental and adult
relationships." 25
0
While institutionalization and foster care are detrimental to the
emotional development of the black child,25 l studies have generally
shown that transracially adopted children develop well emotionally. 2 2
One study, focusing on the adoption of black children by white
families, found that "some black adoption workers saw transracial
adoptions as a perhaps less-preferable but nevertheless pragmatic
means of giving black children the kind of continuing care, nurturance
and sense of belonging so important to the child's optimum physical,
emotional, and social development. "253 No evidence supports the
proposition that only a black family can provide a black child with
self-esteem and self-awareness.
246. Howard, supra note 13, at 535.
247. See supra Part V.A.
248. See supra notes 197 to 208 and accompanying text.
249. Silverman, supra note 202.
250. A.R. Dharma, M.K. McGue, and Benson, P.L., The Emotional and Behavioral
Adjustment of United States Adopted Adolescents: Part 1. An Overview, CHILD. & YOUTH
SERV. REV. 18, 83-100.
251. Howard, supra note 13, at 535 (noting that the weight of clinical data and
psychological opinion supports this conclusion). See also Howard, supra note 13, at n. 14-24.
252. Id. at 537.
253. See id at n.21.
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F. Race-Based Placement Violates the Fourteenth Amendment
Race-based placement is a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VI section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.254 The Supreme Court has continued to view racial
classification for the purpose of child placement as inherently
suspect.255  In Palmore v. Sidoti,256 a unanimous Court held that a
"core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all
governmentally imposed discrimination based on race., 257 The Court
noted that when persons are classified by race, that classification is
"more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public
concerns" 258 and, as a result, any such classifications "are subject to
the most exacting scrutiny." 259  Additionally, in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 26 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule in
Palmore and made it clear that all racial and ethnic distinctions require
strict judicial scrutiny. 261 Courts and agencies can only consider race
in the placement of children if they can demonstrate a compelling state
interest.
While the imposition of strict scrutiny does not result in a per
se violation, only one case, Korematsu v. United States,262 has
survived this high level of judicial strict scrutiny. 263 Korematsu was
the first equal protection case in which the Court applied strict
scrutiny. 264  Additionally, several Supreme Court justices have, in
recent years, declared that they would not have upheld the statute in
question in Korematsu today.265 Thus, the Court has admitted that the
254. Esten, supra note 56, at 1942. See also Publ. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(d) (1994)). "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."
255. Re Petition of R.M.G., 454 A.2d. 776, 787 (App D.C. 1982).
256. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
257. Id. at432.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
261. Id. at 227.
262. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
263. Paul E. McGreal, Alaska Equal Protections: Constitutional Law or Common Law?,
15 ALASKA L. REv. 209 (1998).
264. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214.
265. McGreal, supra note 263. "Members of the Court have since heaped disparagement
on that case, leaving it as the one instance in which a racial classification has survived strict
scrutiny." Id.
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only statute declared constitutional after strict scrutiny analysis would
not survive that same level of scrutiny today.266
When race is used as a factor in child placement decisions, it
falls within the category of illegitimate classifications. Neither the
government nor the adoption agencies cannot justify their use of racial
classification in the decision-making process unless the classification
is a narrowly-tailored measure for achieving some compelling
government interest. Only those policies and practices that can
survive a strict scrutiny analysis can continue. When used as the sole
factor for consideration in adoption placement, race-based adoption
policies cannot survive strict scrutiny. However, when race
consideration is simply one of many factors that will bear on the
child's best interest, there is no Fourteenth Amendment infringement.
VI. CONCLUSION
Every year, thousands of children wait for placement while
267agencies search for qualified families. The paucity of potential
black families to adopt the disproportionate number of black children
makes it even more difficult to place these children. The result is that
these children may be left unadopted for years or in many cases never
adopted at all. The resulting economic impact on society resulting
from this dilemma is considerable. Instead of placing these children in
the homes of eager and qualified families, same-race policies place an
increased burden on the already overtaxed foster care system and put
similar economic pressures on related social welfare agencies.
Many criticize the adoption of black children by white families,
arguing that it deprives these children of necessary self-realization and
cultural pride. Studies have not validated these concerns. There is no
evidence that growing up in a black family is the only way to insure
that a black child will grow into a functional adult. More important is
the recognition that the preservation of culture is a goal that is separate
from the goals of adoptions. Such social engineering is in
contravention to the child's best interest.
If the best interest of the child is met by placing him in a
family that will share his racial, cultural and ethnic heritage, then
transracial adoption may not be the answer. However, delaying
placement to seek out a family of the same race is contrary to the goals
266. Id.
267. Mabry, supra note 9, at 1349.
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of adoption and the best interests of the child. The answer, then, is to
recruit in order to build an existing pool of potential black adoptive
families.
Race as the determinative factor in child placement violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
repeatedly held that any action on the part of the government or
adoption agencies using race as a factor in child placement must
survive strict scrutiny. While race may be one of the factors
considered, it cannot be the only factor considered in child placement.
When race is only one of the factors considered in placement, there is
no equal protection violation. Only when preferential treatment for
placement is based on racial classifications is there an infringement.
In 1896, dissenting in Plessy, Justice Harlan noted that "[o]ur
Constitution is color-blind. 2 68 If the Constitution is color blind, why
isn't the adoption process? The consideration of race in child
placement, logically and constitutionally, does not serve the best
interest of the black or biracial child.
268. Plessy v. Furguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
263

